Western psychologies have traditionally given greater importance to self-development than to interpersonal relatedness, stressing the development of autonomy, independence, and identity as central factors in the mature personality. In contrast, women, many minority groups, and non-Western societies have generally placed greater emphasis on issues of relatedness. This article traces the individualistic bias and recent challenges to this view. It is proposed that evolutionary pressures of natural selection result in two basic developmental lines: interpersonal relatedness and self-definition, which interact in a dialectical fashion. An increasingly mature sense of self is contingent on interpersonal relationships; conversely, the continued development of increasingly mature interpersonal relationships is contingent on mature self-definition. Conclusions include implications for social policy and for facilitating more balanced development of both dimensions in all members of society.

Writers from many disciplines consider how current conceptions of human nature (what anthropologists call indigenous psychologies) affect individual goals and values as well as social policy. Anthropologists Heelas and Lock (1981) stated that “our indigenous psychology works to maintain and fulfill what our social world defines as that which we should be. But perhaps this counts against what our basic psychological nature demands of us: in other words, that sociocultural views of the self do not necessarily fulfill the ‘needs’ of the self as a natural psychological entity” (p. xvi). We propose that a better understanding of our assumptions about human nature can lead to a more comprehensive science of psychology, as well as facilitating greater development of our human potential.

Traditionally, the indigenous psychologies of Western industrialized cultures have stressed the importance of the development of individuality, autonomy, independence, achievement motivation, and identity as essential components of psychological maturity. Social critics suggest that these values have also led to a long-standing and intensifying crisis of alienation in the Western world (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swindler, & Tipton, 1985; Borgen, 1992; Conger, 1981; Lasch, 1978).

Recently various disciplines that attempt to understand human nature have been undergoing challenges to their individualistic orientations. It appears very likely that these challenges will result in fundamental transformations in our view of human nature. For example, in evolutionary biology, human nature was often depicted as essentially selfish and individualistic, but recent investigators argue for the potential of kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and social selection to select for traits that facilitate cooperation, communalism, and altruism in social animal species (Hamilton, 1964; Simon, 1990; Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1975).

Similarly, anthropologists note that the industrialized Western view is unique in its emphasis on separateness, independence, and distinctiveness of the individual from others. Comparisons of other cultures indicate that most non-Western cultures have a more sociocentric ideal of the person that minimizes rather than accentuates self-other distinctions (Geertz, 1979; Heelas & Lock, 1981; Kim & Berry, 1993). Within psychology, the tradition of emphasizing the importance of the development of the self and of identity over the development of social relations has increasingly been challenged by theorists interested in attachment (Bowby, 1969), psychoanalytic object relations (Blatt & Shichman, 1983; Fairbairn, 1954; Guntrip, 1969; Winnicott, 1965), feminism (Chodorow, 1978; Gilligan, 1982; Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Stiver, 1991; Miller, 1976), and non-Western psychologies (Doi, 1973; Kojima, 1984).

This article traces the history of theories of the self and human development and the rise of an individualistic bias in viewing human nature and describes the emergence of challenges to this view. These challenges suggest that the modern Western view of self-contained individualism (Sampson, 1988) is narrow and incomplete. The goal of this article is not to devalue self-development or to pit individuality against interpersonal relatedness as incompatible trends inevitably in opposition. Theories emphasizing either dimension at the expense of the other necessarily limit people’s understanding of psychological

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development. Rather, individuality (or sense of self) and the sense of relatedness to others develop in a transactional, interrelated, and dialectical manner, with higher levels of self-development making possible higher levels of interpersonal relatedness and vice versa (Blatt, 1990, in press-b; Blatt & Blass, 1990, in press; Blatt & Schichman, 1983).

Traditional Psychological Views of Personality Development

Individuality is considered an essential element of contemporary Western society (Sampson, 1985). By contrast, in ancient and less technological societies, there has been relatively little concept of an isolated and atomistic self (Baumeister, 1987; Morris, 1972; Tuan, 1982). It was with the emergence of participatory societies, Periclean Athens, 2nd century Rome, 13th century mercantile Italy, Elizabethan England, and the United States that individualism was most fully developed. Individuality in the Western world developed in part as a reaction to the authoritarian demands of the church and feudal society. Although the sources of these developments were complicated and involved social, religious, political, and economic factors, individualism emerged as a major social and personal force at least by the late medieval period and early Renaissance (Blatt, 1983, in press-a; Blatt & Blatt, 1984; Morris, 1972).

The implications of this greater emphasis on individualism were revolutionary. For example, Maybury-Lewis (1992) argued that the shift toward emphasizing the dignity and rights of the individual and the severing of traditional supportive and constraining obligations to kin and community was the sociological equivalent of splitting the atom. Individualism unleashed human creativity, enabling extraordinary technical advances.

By the 18th century, Western philosophical and psychological views of human nature had become fundamentally individualistic. Hogan (1975) described four psychologies of individualism that currently dominate Western thought on human nature. Although there are striking differences among them, Hogan argued that all four psychologies are alike in their neglect of social aspects of psychological functioning:

1. Romantic individualism, associated with Rousseau, emphasizes that people are naturally good, are interested in mastery, and tend to develop in a healthy, mature, and moral fashion if not corrupted by society. Psychologists whose work is consonant with these assumptions include G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey, Carl Rogers, and Jean Piaget.

2. Egoistic individualism, associated with Hobbes and Nietzsche, often forms the basis of conservative political philosophies. In this view of human nature, people are seen as fundamentally selfish, egocentric, and aggressive, and these tendencies must be suppressed by civilization. Freud (e.g., 1930/1961) worked in part from this perspective.

3. Ideological individualism sees social hierarchy as coming between human beings and the truth; here institutions must always be evaluated against an individual's vision of the truth. Hogan (1975) cites Kohlberg's (1963) theory of moral development as an example of ideological individualism.

4. Alienated individualism holds that the intellectual begins with a responsibility to repudiate society; intellectuals cannot help but be alienated because they realize social institutions are ephemeral and essentially invalid. Existential and phenomenological psychologists such as Perls (1947), May (1958), and Laing (1967) agreed that to the degree that individuals identify with their social roles, they are inauthentic.

Despite the differing conclusions of these four philosophical positions (which also represent four current indigenous psychologies regarding basic human nature, all four have a fundamental egocentric bias. The individual is not viewed as an integral part of his or her social world; the feeling of belonging to a group is not seen as giving life purpose and direction. Rather, society is viewed as either corrupting or civilizing our basically asocial nature.

Influences From Evolutionary Biology

Initial scientific support for an egocentric view of human nature seems to have come from Darwin's (1859) theory of evolution by natural selection. The interpretation of Darwin as a proponent of a highly individualistic theory of natural selection deeply affected the scientists of the time, including Freud (Sulloway, 1979), and continues to be influential in behavioral sciences and economics. The fundamental principle of Darwin's theory is the assertion that heritable traits that confer an advantage on an individual will be selected in a population. Differential survival and reproduction over many generations result in increasing prevalence of these traits.

An important aspect of this theory is the assumption that the mechanism of natural selection necessarily operates at the individual level and selects inevitably for aggressive self-interest. Darwinian theory was taken to imply that all animals, including humans, were exclusively motivated by self-interest. The theory of natural selection suggests that those individuals who behave selfishly are more likely to thrive and leave more offspring. Thus biology seemed to support the view that people are naturally egoistic and that evolutionary processes must support only behavior that benefits the individual. These beliefs formed a further intellectual base for much of individualistic capitalist political theory.

Naturalistic observations of animal species, however, regularly find prosocial behaviors, cooperative and helping behaviors, and altruism in social species. These observations posed a problem for evolutionary theorists, who realized that the original formulation of natural selection theory could not account for the evolution of such behaviors (Michod, 1982). Although Darwin (1871) and others described altruistic behavior in animals, it has only been since the 1960s that careful fieldwork and sophisticated mathematical models have proposed selective mechanisms for such cooperative and altruistic behaviors.
Evolutionary Advantages of Interpersonal Relatedness

In the past three decades, several developments in evolutionary theory have demonstrated that altruism and cooperative behavior can be at a selective advantage in closely related kin groups (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971; Wilson, 1975). Mathematical modeling and simulation have demonstrated that if interactions between individuals are not random, if individuals do not treat all others alike, if they can recognize kin and tend to behave differently with kin, then altruism can be selected as long as there is indeed some genetic basis for the social behavior in question (Hamilton, 1964). This process has been dubbed kin selection.

A model for a set of behaviors operating according to the principles of kin selection is parental care. If parental care benefits children, then those parents who leave more descendants as a result of their caretaking will contribute more genes to the next generation, in comparison with neglectful parents. The mechanisms of kin selection for behavior toward other relatives are thought to operate in the same way. For example, the genetic consequences of offspring care and of sibling care are actually similar because half our genes, on average, are shared with our siblings. If an individual helps two siblings (or four cousins, aunts, or uncles) so that they reproduce more effectively, he or she may be as far ahead in terms of contributing to the future gene pool as if that individual helped himself or herself.

This form of selection for complex social behaviors depends on the presence of genetic relatedness between members of a social group. Field biologists, however, have also observed seemingly altruistic and cooperative behavior among unrelated members of social groups (Michod, 1982); for example, unrelated vampire bats will regurgitate a blood meal to a starving cagemate (Wilkinson, 1988). Trivers (1971) proposed a model of reciprocal altruism to account for these observations, assuming that individuals will remember being helped and will help in turn when needed. In order for selection to favor reciprocal altruism, individuals must live together in stable social groups, be able to recognize each other, and remember the past behavior of individuals. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) modeled evolutionary strategies using the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and concluded that when the probability of two individuals meeting each other again is sufficiently high, cooperation based on reciprocity can thrive and be evolutionarily stable in a population with no genetic relatedness at all. It is likely that there has been adequate time in primate and human history for the evolution of cooperative behavior and symbolic systems for defining, identifying, and remembering those individuals involved in reciprocal sharing. Anthropologists have regularly documented elaborate gift exchange systems in non-Western and tribal societies in which people are, indeed, bonded to each other by a network of obligations (Ho, 1993; Kim & Berry, 1993; Maybury-Lewis, 1992).

Still, among humans, strangers are often the recipients of prosocial behaviors. Simon (1990) developed a model for such altruism that does not depend on reciprocity, that is, on the rational return on investment. It is based on what Simon called bounded rationality, the notion that in a complex social world it is impossible to rationally calculate return, and on what he called human docility, an innate receptivity to social influence that allows the individual to learn social skills and proper behaviors. When an individual is “undersocialized,” that is, insensitive to the needs of others and unmoved by guilt and shame, others tend to avoid him or her. Simon argues that if selfish individuals have decreased “fitness” because society frowns on them, then altruists will increase in the population as long as the cost of altruism is outweighed by the social benefits.

In addition, modern evolutionary biologists no longer agree that selection can take place only at the level of the individual. Gould (1992) argued that selection operates simultaneously at several levels, including genes, organisms, local populations, and species. If selection does indeed work at these levels, then populations of altruists might have had a selective advantage over selfish populations in the evolutionary past.

Although biological theory has long been cited to account for the development of individuality and aggressive self-interest, there are now evolutionary models that can account for the development of an altruistic, cooperative, interpersonally related self.

Observational Evidence for Inmate Interpersonal Relatedness in Humans

Additional support for the innate development of interpersonal relatedness in humans comes from research on attachment (Bowlby, 1969), studies of prosocial behavior in infants and young children (e.g., Hoffman, 1981), and investigations of role taking (Hogan, 1975). On the basis of ethological theory and studies of the behavior of young children separated from their parents, Bowlby (1969) marshaled persuasive evidence for a biological basis for the propensity to form strong emotional attachments from earliest infancy through adulthood. He noted that this intense desire to form bonds with others leads to attachments, sometimes in the care-seeking role and sometimes as a caregiver (Bowlby, 1988). This adaptation is necessary in species like humans, in which the infant has a long period of dependency after birth. Studies of loneliness and social isolation have demonstrated that we have a basic need for interpersonal contact, physically as well as symbolically mediated. Infants whose needs for food and shelter are met but who are deprived of physical contact may die (Provenz & Lipton, 1962; Spitz, 1946). Even in adults, loneliness is associated with depressed immuno-competence (Blatt, Cornell, & Eshkol, 1993; Weiss, 1987), and individuals with kin or friend support systems are less likely to be hospitalized with psychiatric disorders (Essock-Vitale & Fairbanks, 1979). Such studies point toward a biological need for as well as inherited behavioral action patterns that facilitate interpersonal relatedness;
they suggest a complex interplay between social and biological factors in the development of human psychological processes.

A review of literature on prosocial behavior (Hoffman, 1981) concluded that there is a powerful instinctive drive to aid others in distress, a drive that can be detected even in newborn infants. For example, day-old babies become distressed when they hear another baby crying (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). Research has found high levels of helping behavior in children between nine months and two years of age (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Pyle, 1988). Almost as soon as young children are able to engage in helping behavior, they have been observed to do so (Hoffman, 1981). In contrast, traditional psychoanalytic and cognitive theories predict that conscience and concern for others emerge around six or seven years, either with the resolution of the Oedipus complex and the sublimation of basic drives (Freud, 1923/1961) or with the beginning of operational thought and concomitant planning for complex pursuit of self-interest (Piaget, 1964). Observations of children show the emergence of helping behavior among the first activities of life.

Additional evidence for the development of interpersonal relatedness comes from the phenomenon of children's compliance with rules and roles. Hogan (1975) noted that children spontaneously use a wide variety of roles in their interactions with others. He argued that children come into the world genetically prepared to accept a wide variety of seemingly arbitrary rules, including those that govern social interaction, speech, dress, and dietary customs. Friedman (1985) posited a biological basis for the existence of emotions such as guilt that arise when an individual has injured or failed to help others. He argued that such emotions are the result of natural selection for an altruistic line of motivations in human life.

**Revisions of Developmental Theory**

Various writers have questioned the traditional view of healthy development as leading toward ever greater levels of separation and individuation. Bowlby (1969) and psychoanalytic object relations theorists (e.g., Fairbairn, 1954; Guntrip, 1969; Winnicott, 1965) have emphasized the individual's perception and experience of the other rather than of the self. They have argued that relationships and some form of dependency constitute a fundamental matrix for all personality development. Fairbairn (1954) asserted that libido is fundamentally object seeking in that emotional energy is directed toward relatedness rather than drive reduction. On the basis of an analysis of family systems, Bowen (1966) argued that the individual exists not alone but in the emotional unit of the family.

In the past two decades, feminist theorists have also challenged the phallocentric and individualistic bias in traditional psychological theories (Jordan et al., 1991). Miller (1976) and Gilligan (1982) pointed out that all major developmental theorists to date have used male development as the norm, including Freud, Erikson, Piaget, and Kohlberg. They argued that these theories of human development misunderstand and neglect important dimensions of personality development, especially those occurring in female development. Jordan et al. (1991) and Gilligan et al. (1991) argued that a woman's sense of self is organized around being able to attain and maintain affiliation and relationships. This self-in-relation theory marks a major departure from phallocentric developmental perspectives. In traditional views of psychological development that focus on separation, women's concern with relationships is often viewed as a weakness or even as pathological.

This gender difference in perspective may arise from the different developmental tasks posed for boys and for girls in nuclear families that establish differential emphases on self-definition and relatedness in the development of men and women (Chodorow, 1978). When a little boy realizes he is not the same gender as his mother, he must differentiate himself from her, and the boy's emphasis on individuality and identity derives partly from the developmental task of having to shift, early in life, the object of gender identification from the first object of attachment. This may lead boys to greater concerns with being separate and individual, as compared with girls, for whom such differentiation and contrast from mother is not necessary (Blatt & Shichman, 1983; Chodorow, 1978).

**Cultural Critiques**

Challenges to the modern Western view of human development have also come from anthropologists studying traditional tribal cultures, from members of minority groups, and from non-Western psychologists. As noted above, the modern Western view is peculiar in its emphasis on separation and individuality. Many other cultures do not conceptualize the person apart from his or her relationships. They exhibit what Sampson (1988) called *ensembled individualism*, in which the self versus the nonself boundary is less sharply drawn and others are included within the sense of self. To give just a few examples, in traditional Asian cultures, the self cannot be defined outside of its relationships (Doi, 1973; Ho, 1993; Kim & Berry, 1993; Kojima, 1984); Howell (1981) writes that the Chewong of Malaysia do not distinguish sharply between the individual and nature; for the Maori, the person is not considered to be the primary agent determining his or her own life (Smith, 1981); and in Islamic, Confucian, and Hindu cultures, the individual is embedded in a web of social relationships and obligations (Choi, Kim, & Choi, 1993; Harré, 1981; Ho, 1993). Indeed, historically most societies have been considerably more sociocentric than have our own (see reviews by Heelas & Lock, 1981; Kim & Berry, 1993).

Critics within Western culture have suggested that individualistic values have also led to alienation (Yankelovich, 1981), narcissism (Lasch, 1978), terrifying isolation (Bellah et al., 1985), a joyless culture of consumption (Borgmann, 1992), violence (Hsu, 1983), and the devaluation of women (Miller, 1976) and minorities (Lykes, 1983). The competitive life is a lonely one. Slater (1976) pointed out that each contest leads only to a new
one, although people caught up in the rat race are often deeply hungry for trust and fraternity with their colleagues. One study (Yankelovich, 1981) found that 70% of Americans have few close friends and experience this as a serious void in their lives. The development of individualistic patterns in Western society has left individuals alienated from others and prone to narcissistic self-absorption, and it has often left modern families isolated from community and familial support systems.

There is now ample evidence that the Western over-emphasis on individuality has been one-sided and has led to a distorted view of psychological development. This has resulted in devaluing the development of women and in a misunderstanding of, and disregard for, the beliefs of non-Western cultures. In addition, in the dominant culture it has fostered feelings of alienation and narcissistic self-absorption.

It is important to note that some revisionist psychoanalytic theorists, for example Fairbairn (1954) and more recently Surrey (1991), have reacted to the individualistic bias in psychological theory by devaluing self-development and adopting a stance that is also one-sided. Surrey wrote that

the notion of self-in-relation involves an important shift in emphasis from separation to relationship as the basis for self-experience and development. Further, relationship is seen as the basic goal of development, i.e., the deepening capacity for relationship and relational competence. The self-in-relation model assumes that other aspects of self (e.g., creativity, autonomy, assertion) develop within this primary context. (p. 52)

In contrast, we argue here that both a sense of individuality and sense of relatedness to others develop throughout the life cycle in an interrelated, transactional, and dialectical manner (Blatt, 1990, in press-b; Blatt & Blass, 1990, in press; Blatt & Shichman, 1983).

**A Dialectical Model of the Development of Interpersonal Relatedness and Self-Definition in Development**

It appears quite likely that natural selection in the intelligent, adaptable, and social *Homo sapiens* has resulted in two separate developmental lines or sets of tasks, constituting the phenomena and processes of individuality and relatedness. Many writers from different disciplines have described dual aspects of human nature. For example, Freud (1930/1961) wrote of two urges: an urge toward union with others and an egoistic urge toward happiness. Others have given these phenomena terms such as surrender and autonomy (Angyal, 1951), ocnphilic and philobatic tendencies (Balint, 1959), communion and agency (Bakan, 1966), togetherness and individuality (Bowen, 1966), attachment and separation (Bowby, 1969), motives for affiliation or intimacy and motives for power or achievement (McAdams, 1980; McClelland, 1980), individuation and attachment (Franz & White, 1985), the capacity for interpersonal relatedness and the development of self-definition (Stewart & Malley, 1987), and mutualistic and individualistic urges (Slavin & Kriegman, 1992).

Although selection pressures may be pushing in different and divergent directions (e.g., toward self-development and also relatedness), Blatt and his colleagues (Blatt, 1990, in press-b; Blatt & Blass, 1990, in press; Blatt & Shichman, 1983) have argued that the result is a dialectical system in which achievements in one sphere make possible further developments in the other. It is apparent, for example, that an increasingly differentiated, integrated, and mature sense of self is contingent on establishing satisfying interpersonal relationships; conversely, the development of mature relationships is contingent on the development of mature self-identity. These two developmental processes evolve in an interactive, reciprocally balanced, mutually facilitating fashion from birth through senescence (Blatt & Shichman, 1983).

Individuality and relatedness appear to develop in a relatively independent process until mid- or late adolescence (although a case could be made for an earlier interrelationship). At this point, these lines become dialectically interrelated and integrated in the formation of what Erikson (1950) has called an identity. Even after this temporary synthesis in an adolescent identity, however, a dialectical tension between these two lines continues throughout the life cycle. Further levels of identity formation integrate elements of one’s individuality and one’s relatedness in kinship and community ties. The coordination and integration of individuality and relatedness in the process of identity formation is essential if the individual is to enter into the adult phases of the life cycle that lead to the establishment of Erikson’s stages of intimacy and generativity. The expression of these higher forms of relatedness and self-definition (Erikson’s intimacy and generativity) are reintegrated yet again in the development, in mature adulthood, of what Erikson called integrity. Thus, identity and integrity in the Erikson model are phases in the integration and consolidation of the individuality and relatedness lines of development (Blatt & Blass, 1990, in press).

The synthesis of these two developmental lines in an integrated self-identity in late adolescence results in more mature expressions of relatedness that are characterized by mutuality and intimacy, in fuller expressions of individuality in generativity and personal creativity, and in a commitment to values and long-term goals. The sense of self-worth and pride that emerges during the pre-adolescent phases of the development of individuality now allows the individual to feel that he or she has something to offer and share with others. Likewise, generativity is not merely individualistically task oriented because it is also integrated with relatedness; generativity involves a concern for extending beyond one’s own self-interest and dedicating oneself to goals, values and principles, the teaching of another generation, and mentoring. Thus, intimacy and generativity—the capacities to form a mutual relationship with another, to participate in society, and to be dedicated to one’s own self-interest and expression—emerge out of the integration and consolidation of indi-
viduality and relatedness in the development of a self-
identity and continue through midlife and beyond (Blatt

Our analysis suggests that these themes of relatedness
and community have emerged and gained attention in
the fields of evolutionary biology and anthropology, as
well as among feminist and non-Western theorists. From
the vantage point of both women and men, there is a
need to develop a more encompassing sense of identity,
including a stable, realistic, positive sense of the self as
effective and competent, as well as a capacity for relat-
edness characterized by mutuality, reciprocity, and deep-
ening intimacy. We need to recognize that healthy per-
sonality development involves equal and complementary
emphasis on individuality and relatedness for both men
and women.

Conclusion

Anthropologists argue that a people's indigenous psy-
chology has profound influence on individual goals and
values as well as on social policies (Heelas & Lock, 1981).
As Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1990) suggested,
It is of no little moment for the human future whether people
are necessarily and consistently selfish, as is sometimes argued
in population genetics and economics, or whether there is a
significant place for altruism in the scheme of human behavior.
(p. 1665)

Despite accumulating evidence from biology, anthropol-
y, and psychology, the psychology of human develop-
ment is still largely presented as though separation and
individuation represent the highest levels of maturity.

If humans are motivated by cooperative urges and
and the desire to be more related, as well as selfish urges and
the desire for autonomy, how might a shift in our indig-}

enous psychology affect social policy and individual goals
and values? In terms of the development of men and
women in our culture, several changes are possible. The
underdevelopment of interpersonal relatedness in men
and of a sense of self in women implies that both men
and women miss their full potential as human beings. As
a group, men in our society tend to attend more to self-
development and to underemphasize interpersonal relat-
edness (Chevron, Quinlan, & Blatt, 1978). Perhaps as a
consequence, American women are often disappointed
with their intimate relationships with men (Bernard,
1972; Lerner, 1986; Rubin, 1983). For men, this unbal-
anced development may result in a sense of alienation
and grief over loss of their connection to others, even to
other men (Bly, 1990; Keen, 1991), as well as chronic
relationship problems with women.

In Western cultures women have long been seen as
more developed in interpersonal relatedness (Bakan,
1966). Feminist theorists believe that relational devel-

opment is primary for women and that this represents
both a culturally undervalued strength and a develop-
mental vulnerability in that women risk losing themselves
in their relationships. The popularity among women of
books on codependency attests to the extent to which
many women feel an inadequately developed sense of self
and often sacrifice self-development to relationship de-
velopment. In typical American families in which fathers
have been less involved in the care of young children,
little girls may learn to focus energy on engaging their
distant fathers (and other men in later relationships).

Following Chodorow (1978), we suggest that the
fullest development of both boys and girls is more likely
if both parents are actively engaged in parenting so that
an infant can become deeply attached to both, thereby
reducing the basic childhood dilemma that may lead men
to be fearful of relatedness and overconcerned with issues
of autonomy and women to overdevote energy to relat-
edness. Greater involvement by fathers in childrearing
could result in a cultural shift in our indigenous psy-
chology away from exaggerated individualism.

If we are to more fully develop our sense of com-

munity and relatedness, a second policy issue involves
the need for society to support people living in stable,
interacting groups. Among all social animals, including
humans, altruism and cooperation thrive when individ-
uals interact with known others. This can occur in stable
neighborhoods in large cities (Tuan, 1982), as well as in
villages. Modern political theorists such as Taylor (1982)
and Kemmis (1990) have argued that the natural political
unit is the interacting community, where relationships
between members are direct and multifaceted and where
individuals can know and be known to each other. Kem-

mis called for the development of a politics of place where
a community of people can shape politics into a coop-
erative and humane enterprise.

Finally, we suggest that policy approaches to pre-
viously intractable social problems, such as the cycle
of poverty, might change in both subtle and profound ways
if we believed that people thrive in being interpersonally
related and are motivated by social as well as self-interest.
For example, we currently target most monies for anti-
poverty programs to individuals or to the mother-child

dyad, as in Aid for Families with Dependent Children,
Headstart, and various jobs programs. We have ignored
the lessons provided by the impressive success of those
non-Western and tribal people in the United States who
manage to maintain aspects of their cultural organization
when they emigrate to the West, monetarily impoverished
but rich in family and cultural ties. Their success is in
contrast to the bleak prospects of the children of Native
 Americans on reservations and the African American
underclass in inner cities. The cultures of both of these
groups have been greatly disrupted by governmental and
economic policies. For example, in a federal effort to
eradicate Indian culture, Native American children were
sent away from their families to boarding schools where
they were forbidden to speak their native language (De-
loria, 1988). Africans were forcibly separated from their
families by slave traders, and, until emancipation, parents
were often not allowed to marry or keep their children
with them. Despite these destructive forces, courageous
men, women, and communities risked much to preserve
family and culture, and those who have successfully bro-

February 1994 • American Psychologist 109
ken the cycle of poverty frequently attribute their success to the support of family or community.

Yet, even now, the structure of the welfare system often requires a woman to forgo financial help if she lives with her children’s father. Surely this system perpetuates poverty by separating fathers from their children and leaving women with impoverished interpersonal resources in an increasingly hostile world. The intent of the shapers of welfare policy is not to perpetuate poverty but to help women with dependent children. However, to accomplish that goal with a policy that forces women to choose between money (for food and shelter) and relationship only appears to make sense in a country whose indigenous psychology is radically individualistic. As Sampson (1988) argued, self-contained individualism may actually thwart the core American cultural values of freedom, responsibility, and achievement that is presumed to support.

The debate on human nature has been characterized by disagreement over whether humans are basically self- or socially motivated. This model suggests that potentialities for both egotism and altruism are present in each person. Moreover, both self-development and interpersonal relatedness can develop in distorted forms leading to the excesses of narcissistic self-absorption on the one hand and mass compliance on the other. This article also argues that greater development in one sphere is made possible by concomitant development in the other. The recognition of the importance of both self-development and interpersonal relatedness, and of their reciprocal and dialectical mutual facilitation in normal development, can provide a theoretical basis for appreciating and encouraging the development of these essential dimensions in all members of society.

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