

has been spreading because the Lewinian spirit has been heeded and sustained. Social psychologists debate the ethics of their procedures and conduct research aimed at empowerment and social amelioration. They have discovered a wide variety of attitude-change devices that entail freedom of choice and enhancement of alternatives. Neglect of informed consent is the exception, not the rule, in the conduct of research by social psychologists. Most important, most social psychologists would like to have the status of their work evaluated by a much more thorough and much less biased consideration of their literature. We think it is fortunate that "Behavior Technologies" (Kipnis, 1994) is not what present-day social psychology is all about.

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- tion of Western, especially American, theories of psychological development that revolve around the cultural assumption of the self-contained individual. Their remedy is not to reject the egocentric direction but to counterpose another, equally vital direction neglected by that tradition, namely, a "sociocentric" component in development that stresses the self's relatedness, attachment to others, and altruism. They pointed to recently published psychological literature as, for instance, feminism or psychoanalytic object relations. These scholars, along with others, mount an evermore cogent critique of a developmental psychology that neglects the relational context in favor of an assumed privileged role attributed to the individual "self."
- Guisinger and Blatt (1994) then proposed an evolutionary solution to integrate these two directions of ontogenetic development. These directions are aligned with two basic urges, or drives, that have been variously postulated as inherent in human nature, including Freud's two drives. (The authors named these drives *eros* and *happiness*, a somewhat curious interpretation, but the issue is not essential to their main argument.) They held that there is ample evidence to accept an innate tendency toward "self-in-separation" as well as toward "self-in-relation" and that these two tendencies work in a dialectical tension and have been selected for the evolutionary advantage this dialectic attains in modern humans.
- My critical comments concern the phrase *self-in-relation*. What type of relation do the authors have in mind? With some exceptions (that are not noted as such), the relational context is invariably illustrated by concrete, interpersonal situations, such as the bonding and attachment between infants and caregivers, altruism shown to specific others, and the deepening capacity for relationship and relational competence. Where in this picture is the structure of society or culture? Is the nature of any society adequately described by a web of interpersonal caring? I do not want to devalue the developmental import of healthy interpersonal relation, but how does all this lead to active and constructive participation in societal institutions, such as political activities, responsible roles in work and play, sharing and mutual enjoyment of traditions and art, practice of a principled morality, or interest in the history of society? These and many other kinds of social involvement that could be cited are only tangentially related to what goes by the name of caring and interpersonal relation. Surely, evolution must have made human society and thereby humans themselves robust enough not to be at the mercy of early interpersonal contingencies.
- How could evolution have reached the context of human society without which there is no *Homo sapiens sapiens*? This is the crucial evolutionary issue that must be seriously addressed (Furth, 1990, preface, 1992, 1994; Furth & Kane, 1992). Vague connotations of relating and caring are not adequate to the task. When biologists coined terms such as *altruistic*, *prosocial*, and *inclusive fitness*, they attributed these to non-human animals. I know it is today politically incorrect to imply that in human society we have a biologically different context. In any case, in humans altruism is not and never has been a serious problem as it was thought to be for a context dominated by instinctual behavioral patterns.
- Once it is recognized that society or culture is the defining relational context for the evolutionary history of humans, it does not seem to make much sense to conceptualize a self as dialectically opposed to the societal context. For, as Guisinger and Blatt (1994) amply documented, self is a societal institution as surely as any custom or ritual. In this sense the article did not really go beyond the very tradition the authors wished to rectify. For to them *self* is still king or queen, even when the self is viewed in the context of a healthy Western family.

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Developmental Lines, Schemas, and Archetypes

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We appreciate Furth's (1995, this issue) interest in our article (Guisinger & Blatt, February 1994) and the responses of others

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Guisinger and Blatt (February 1994) argued persuasively against the entrenched tradi-

who have written to us directly. It appears that Furth is in agreement with some of our arguments, but he chides us for not going further. Before responding to that challenge, we wish to clarify and restate our position with regard to the operation of evolutionary processes.

In addition to emphasizing that natural selection works at the level of the individual, not the society, it is also important to note that the current human genotype is a result of past evolution. Furth (1995) states that we hold that the two ontogenetic developmental lines mentioned in our article have been selected for "the evolutionary advantage this dialectic attains in modern humans" (Furth, 1995, p. 176). If a trait or structure selected over the millions of years of hominid evolution is currently adaptive, that is indeed fortunate; however, "modern" humanity accounts for only a tiny fraction of the time humans and humanlike primates have been on the earth and subject to selection pressures. Thus, these two developmental lines must have been advantageous over a long period of premodern hominid evolution.

We suggested (Guisinger & Blatt, 1994) that in the course of human evolution there was selection pressure favoring both expressions of individuality and interpersonal relatedness in human ontogenetic development. Although it is possible that these two developmental lines may have evolved separately in the course of human phylogenetic development, ontogenetically these processes now develop in a dialectical manner, each facilitating the development of the other. Greater development of a sense of self makes possible increasingly mature interpersonal relatedness, and vice versa (Blatt & Blass, 1990, in press; Blatt & Shichman, 1983).

These points aside, Furth (1995) poses a very relevant question: How does the developmental line of relatedness lead to the formation of society? Furth, from a Piagetian perspective, is interested in the kinds of schemas children develop for society, how children "construct society" in the course of their own and culture's development (Furth, 1992; Furth & Kane, 1992). He suggests that there are schemas that lead to "active and constructive participation in societal institutions, such as political activities, responsible roles in work and play, sharing and mutual enjoyment of traditions and art, practice of a principled morality, or interest in the history of society" (Furth, 1995, p. 176). He apparently believes these are innate because he comments, "Surely, evolution must have made human society and thereby humans themselves robust enough not to be at the mercy of early interpersonal contingencies" (p. 176). Furth crit-

icizes us for not discussing the likelihood that evolution predisposes humans to construct not only a web of interpersonal caring (with its prototype in the parent-infant attachment dyad) but also the network of relationships inherent in society and culture.

Furth (1995) raises interesting and important issues and highlights an area where the two of us differ in our response to Furth. It is possible to argue that all intrapersonal and interpersonal schemas are derivatives of individuality and relatedness, respectively, developing out of mother-infant caring experiences. It is also possible to argue, as does Furth, that humans have separate innate schemas for individuation, interpersonal, and wider societal relations.

Guisinger (1995), in a discussion of the biological bases of diverse interpersonal schemas, argued that it is likely that evolutionary processes in social humans led to separate lines of ontogenetic development involving the construction of schemas for parent-child relationships, friendships, communal participation, including readiness to learn social rules and roles (Hogan, 1975), and erotic relationships. Guisinger points out that Jung anticipated the idea of many innate schemas for development in his description of well-differentiated intrapersonal schemas guiding individuation (which he called "archetypes"), but he fell short of developing an interpersonal or relational psychology.

In response to Furth (1995), one of us (see also Guisinger, 1995) suggests that the disorder of childhood autism and its variants may represent the failure of such specific innate schemas having to do with parent-child relationships, social participation, friendship, erotic relationships, and sense of self. The fact that some autistic individuals are intelligent—even gifted—in other areas of cognitive development but are seriously deficient in comprehending the organization and texture of important social relations leads Guisinger to conclude that the normal child has innate core mental schemas to which societal experiences not limited to parenting, caretaking, and attachment can be assimilated.

In contrast, the other of us (see also Blatt & Blass, 1992, in press) believes that these societal schemas are natural extensions of interpersonal experiences within the family matrix and peer relationships. Blatt's view is that these schemas develop out of parent-child caring experiences, which extend naturally to the child's beginning awareness, around four to six years with the advent of operational thinking and the oedipal phase, that he or she is an inherent part of a complex family system.

Participation in the family social system subsequently extends to participation

in peer relations and creates the schemas for participation in society beyond the confines of the family. Blatt's contention is that because an overemphasis on intellectual development is essentially an expression of the self-definitional line, it is possible to have uneven development, especially in particular forms of psychopathology, in which intellectual development outstrips the development of interpersonal relatedness. More mature forms of relatedness, including the capacity to share in mature intimate relationships as well as in broader societal processes (e.g., Erikson's generativity), emerge from experiences of participating effectively within the social systems of the family and peer relationships.

The fact that we disagree in our response to Furth on this issue regarding the number and variety of "core" primary relational schemas suggests the importance of the questions that Furth has considered in his research and in his response to our article. We appreciate his raising this issue and agree that this is an essential area for subsequent investigation.

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